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I. EARLY HISTORY OF APPORTIONMENT LEGISLATION
An apportionment is defined as "a distribution made by the Bureau of the
Budget of an appropriation, contract authorization or other statutory authori-
zation into amounts available for specified time periods, activities, functions,
projects, objects, or combinations thereof. The amounts so apportioned limit
he obligations to be incurred."
While the system of apportionments has been designed for, and does
serve, a multiplicity of purposes, all are generally considered subordinate to
the primary purpose of insuring that agencies so administer their appropria-
tions as not to incur deficits.
The Congress has long been interested in steps to combat the tendency
'or executives to commit the government before adequate funds were made
available. As early as 1842, Congress forbade payment of accounts of certain
2
commissions of inquiry until special appropriations had been made by law.
Some years later, Congress made it unlawful for any executive depart-
ment or other Government establishment of the United States to expend a sum
n excess of its available appropriations, and from accepting voluntary services
or employing personal services in excess of that expressly authorized by law,
except in cases of sudden emergency involving the loss of life or the destruc-
1 Bureau of the Budget and Treasury Department,
Budget - Treasury Regulation No. 1 as revised through September,
1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office), sec. 21.
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tion of property. It is interesting to note that that portion of the act of 1870
relating to the administration of appropriations was designed solely to prevent
expenditures in excess of amounts appropriated.
It was not until 1905, approximately thirty-five years later, that the
Congress took additional and substantial action to eliminate deficits. At that
time the provision of the act of 1870 was amplified by section 4 of the Defi-
2
ciency Appropriation Act of March 3, 1905, and was further amended a year
3
later by the Urgent Deficiency Act enacted February 27, 1906. The 1905
amendment provided that "all appropriations made for contingent expenses or
other general purposes", except the contingent appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and certain others under which the rate of ex-
penditure was administratively uncontrollable, should be so apportioned over
the year of availability as to insure that the funds available would serve the
entire year, so as to "prevent expenditures in one portion of the year which
may necessitate deficiency or additional appropriations to complete the ser-
vice of the fiscal year for which said appropriations are made". Moreover,
it prohibited waiver or modification of these apportionments except "upon the
happening of some extraordinary emergency or unusual circumstance. " The
authority to make, and waive or modify, apportionments was vested in the
heads of executive departments or agencies and other Government establish-
ments. A penal clause provided for punishing violators by summary removal
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Act for 1871,
16 Stat. 230, 251 (1870).
2
33 Stat. 1214, 1257 (1905).
3
34 Stat. 27, 48-49 (1906), 31 U.S.C. sec. 665 (1940).
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from office, and a fine of not less than $100 or a jail sentence of not less than
one month. The 1906 amendment was minor, and in no way affected the sub-
stance of the basic legislation The foregoing legislation was popularly known
as the Anti-Deficiency Law (section 3679, Revised Statutes) which was set
forth as section 665 of Title 31, United States Code.
Although the responsibility for making apportionments was vested in the
heads of the executive departments, the Bureau of the Budget endeavored to
impress upon the spending agencies the importance of trying to save part of
their appropriations. Beginning in 1921, the Bureau of the Budget requested
the agencies to submit periodic reports concerning their apportionments and
their related expenditures. Numerous circulars were issued by the Bureau of
the Budget designed to strengthen the apportionment mechanism and to effect
savings. Inasmuch as the Anti-Deficiency Law had given the agency heads the
exclusive responsibility for preventing deficiencies, including the authority to
make, waive, or modify apportionments, the Bureau of the Budget was power-
less to enforce its requirements even though the President had put himself
strongly on record in endorsement of the objectives of the Bureau of the
2
Budget.
In 1933, the President was given the power to reorganize the Executive
Branch of the government and to transfer or abolish the functions of any execu-
3
tive agency. Pursuant to this authority, and to strengthen his jurisdiction
over the execution of the budget program. Executive Order 6166, dated
TThe Bureau of the Budget was created by the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921; 42 Stat. 20 (1921), 31 U.S.C. sec. 1 (1940).
2
President Harding, in addressing the first meeting of the Business Organi-
zation of the Government, on 29 June 1921, requested agency heads to set
aside a portion of their funds as savings.






10 June 1933 was issued, transferring the function of making, waiving, or
modifying apportionments from the heads of agencies to the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget. Procedures were immediately prescribed to furnish
such information as was deemed necessary to the proper control of the flow
of appropriation expenditures.
The apportionment provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Law were supple-
mented on 13 August 1940, by Executive Order 8512, which provided for ap-
portionment of each appropriation made to a Government agency, including
amounts made available by the Congress for the administrative expenses of
Government Corporations. This Executive Order also prohibited agencies
from incurring obligations in excess of the amount currently available under
the apportionment; such apportionments to be exceeded only to prevent the loss
of life or Government property.
Although no statutory revision of the Anti-Deficiency Law, referred to
o
previously, occurred until 1950, several actions affecting apportionments did
occur prior to that time.
Changing conditions inevitably will make necessary certain deficiency or
supplemental appropriations. One important factor outside the control of the
spending agencies deserves special mention. During the time between the
preparation of the estimates and the obligating of the appropriation many laws
^Ex. O. No. 6226, July 27, 1933, provided that the Treasury Department
should maintain budgetary accounts on the status of appropriations, that the
agencies should furnish necessary information to the Treasury and that the
Bureau of the Budget should be provided with such reports ae it might require
from the Treasury.
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are enacted by ti c Congress which directly affect suet obligations. Section
203 of toe Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of lb50 expressly provides
that "the President from time to tine may transmit to Congress such pro-
posed supplemental or deficiency appropriations as in his judgment (1) are
necessarv on account of laws enacted after the transmission of the Budget* or
(2) are otherwise in the public interest". Such estimates and the appropria-
tions based thereon (resulting from laws enacted after the transmission of
the Budget) should oe considered strictly as supplemental rather than as de-
ficiency estimates and appropriations, although there has been no clear dis-
tinction in practice between estimates of this character and those required by
situations involving deficiencies. Regardless of the terminology, however,
there can hardly be any disagreement as to the propriety of estimates of the
former character.
On the other hand, situations frequently will arise where appropriations
are in excess of requirements because of circumstances developing subsequent
to the formulation of estimates and the enactment of appropriation acts. It is
obvious that unless some action is taken to conserve such appropriations,
there will be moneys available to the s, ending agencies for which there is no
real need. These moneys frequently will be spent even though the Congress
would not have made the appropriation if it had been requested to do so in the
light of the circumstances existing when the appropriation was obligated.
The need for some control in such situations was recognized by the
Congress in section 303 of the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1944 ,





provided that the President direct the Bureau of the Budget to maintain a con-
tinuous study of certain appropriations and contract authorizations for defense
purposes, with a view to recommending repeal of such portions thereof as
should be deemed no longer required for the purposes for which they were
granted. The second of these provided that, in addition, there should be sub-
mitted to the Congress on 3 January 1946 a list showing the balances of each
such appropriation and contract authorization, together with recommendations
for the repeal of those funds no longer required.
Personnel ceiling legislation, prior to the Budget and Accounting Pro-
cedures Act of 1950 , also had a direct bearing upon the control of appropria-
tions in excess of actual needs. Section 11 of the War Overtime Pay Act of
1943 provided that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget make quarterly de-
terminations of employees required by the executive departments and agencies,
and that there be released any personnel in excess of such determinations.
This procedure was continued by section 607 of the Federal Employees Pay Act
of 1945, as supplemented by section 14 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of
1946. Section 607 also contained a provision that the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget should maintain a continuous study of all appropriations and con-
tract authorizations in relation to personnel employed and should, under poli-
cies prescribed by the President, reserve from expenditure any savings in
salaries, wages, or other categories of expense which he determined to be
possible as a result of " reduced personnel requirements". It was further
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 repealed section 607 of














provided by the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 that such reserves might
be released by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget "for expenditure only
upon a satisfactory showing of necessity".
Summarizing, it will be seen that controls existing prior to the General
1
Appropriation Act of 1951, designed to relate the use of appropriations to
the circumstances actually existing when the appropriations were obligated
included the following:
(1) prohibitions against spending in excess of appropriations;
(2) regulation of the rate of obligations against appropriations through
apportionments, with a view to making certain that the appropriations covered
the entire period which they were intended to serve;
(3) examination of and recommendations for repeal of appropriations
in certain categories when it was demonstrated that any part thereof was not
needed;
(4) personnel ceilings; and
(5) reservation of appropriations from expenditure to the extent that
savings were possible through reduced personnel requirements.
The next part of this paper will consider the difficulties encountered
under the controls as existing above, and the defects in existing legislation
prior to the General Appropriation Act of 1951.






































n. NEED FOR REMEDIAL LEGISLATION PRIOR TO 1950
1
When the Anti-Deficiency Law was amended in 1905 and 1906 , Federal
departments and establishments were few; Federal programs were narrowly
limited in variety and scope; and the problems of management of Federal ex-
penditures were relatively simple. When we consider the Federal Government
of very recent years, with the multiplicity of its agencies, the variety and
scope of its functions, and the size and complexities of its budgetary and oper-
ational problems, it is not surprising that serious dissatisfactions were ex-
pressed in the Congress and in the Executive branch with operations under the
apportionment system instituted under the 1905 and 1906 amendments to the
Anti-Deficiency Law.
Certain technical aspects of the Anti-Deficiency Law created substantial
difficulties in operating under its provisions. For example, it was not at all
clear what was meant by the provision that "all appropriations made for con-
2
tingent expenses or other general purposes" should be apportioned. Nor was
it clear what appropriations were intended to be excluded from the apportion-
ment system by the provision which excepted "appropriations made in fulfill-
ment of contract obligations expressly authorized by law, or for objects re-
quired or authorized by law without reference to the amounts annually appro-
priated therefor". Similarly, it was difficult to obtain any general agreement
as to what was meant by the provision which authorized thezwaiver or modifi-
cation of apportionments "upon the happening of some extraordinary emergency
or unusual circumstance". The fact that annual appropriation bills frequently
See supra at p. 3.
o
See supra at p. 2.
3See supra at p. 2.
(8)
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were not enacted until shortly before, or even after, the beginning of a fiscal
year made it impossible to comply in all cases with the requirement that
apportionments be made "on or before the beginning of each fiscal year" for
which the appropriation was available.
Further, the penalty provisions which provided for punishing violators
by summary removal from office, and a fine of not less than $100 or a jail
sentence of not less than one month , while possibly not severe enough to
constitute adequate punishment for serious and willful violations of the law,
were entirely too severe when considered in connection with minor or inad-
vertent violations, with the result that they were rarely, if ever, enforced.
Aside from the foregoing, the Anti-Deficiency Law was defective in
three major respects. First, the only provision designed to prevent the in-
curring of obligations at an excessive rate was in the form of a requirement
that apportionments be adhered to. However, appropriations, when appor-
tioned, were in most cases broken down into allotments, or allowances for
use by the many hundreds of purchasing and contracting officers and other em-
ployees who actually incurred obligations. In many cases these employees
were not even aware of the amount of the apportionment. There was no
specific statutory prohibition against incurring obligations in excess of such
an allotment or allowance, nor was there any such prohibition against grant-
ing allotments or allowances in excess of apportionments.
The inadequacy of a system which did not follow the appropriation down
into the allotments or allowances was clearly demonstrated in a case in-




















volving a supplemental estimate for the Post Office Department:
The report indicates that the postmaster at Boston had a definite
allowance from the Department, but that he exceeded that allowance
by $160, 898 in the first quarter, $572, 042 in the second quarter, and
$433, 683 in the third quarter, ending March 31, 1947. Although the
obligations incurred for the post office at Boston thus exceeded al-
lowances for that office by more than one million dollars, these obli-
gations, standing alone, were not in excess of the amounts apportion-
ed in the appropriation for the periods mentioned.
Furthermore, obligations were incurred in excess of allowances
at other post offices. The situations in these offices differed only
in degree from the situation in the Boston office. The exceeding of
the allowances in any one of these post offices could have resulted
in obligating the appropriation in excess of the apportionment for a
particular period. However, when allotments or allowances are
exceeded in many places there is no method prescribed in the present
law for determining which of the officers who obligated in excess of
his allowance is actually responsible for incurring obligations in
excess of the apportionment.
A second major defect in the Anti-Deficiency Law was that the provision
for V making apportionments by monthly or other allotments" generally had
been interpreted as requiring apportionments by time periods, and in practice
this had developed into a system of apportioning funds by calendar quarters.
Obviously, apportionments by calendar quarters did not bear any relation to
the operating needs of agencies such as the Forest Service, the National Park
Service, or the Geological Survey whose operations were governed by field
seasons.
Joint letter from F. J. Lawton, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget
and Frank L. Yates, Acting Comptroller General of the United States, to
Hon. Styles Bridges, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate,
June 5, 1947.
see also U. S. Congress, Senate, Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1947 ,
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
Senate, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess. onH.R. 3245, May 9-14, 1947 (Washington:













The inadequacy of an apportionment made on the basis of time periods,
without regard to the manner in which the appropriations were broken down to
meet actual operating needs in incurring obligations, was illustrated by the
report of the Committee on Appropriations of the House on the Second Defi-
ciency Appropriation Bill for 1947. With reference to the Maritime Commis-
sion revolving fund, the Committee stated:
The apportionment runs to the whole of the appropriation rather than
the separate limitations. The Maritime Commission, therefore, in
running a deficiency in the limitation was not running a deficiency in
the appropriation and there was no way for their obligation reports to
the Bureau of the Budget to disclose the true situation with respect to
the administrative expense limitation. The Bureau of the Budget
should immediately look into this matter with view to securing what-
ever amendments to the regulations are necessary to require a sepa-
rate apportionment of funds of this and similar types in order that all
funds may be controlled by the apportionment procedure. If amend-
ments of the law are necessary to accomplish this purpose, the Congress
should be so advised. 1
A third major defect in the Anti-Deficiency Law was that it made no pro-
vision for notifying the Congress when appropriations were being obligated at
a rate which might be expected to result in a request for a deficiency or sup-
plemental appropriation. Even where circumstances did justify obligation at
such a rate, the Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the result because
under the law the first notice of the situation had been in the form of a request
for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation. At that stage, the alternatives
usually were the making of the appropriation or the drastic curtailment of the
activity involved.
Quoted in joint letter from F. J. Lawton, Acting Di ector of the Bureau of the
Budget and Frank L. Yates, Acting Comptroller General of the United States
to Hon. Styles Bridges, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
Senate, June 5, 1947.
I
(12)
In addition to the matters discussed heretofore, the Anti-Deficiency Law,
while designed to prevent deficiencies, did not fill the need for machinery to
conserve appropriations which were in excess of actual requirements. This
inadequacy led the Congress to adopt such expedients as the provisions of the
Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1944 and of the Second Deficiency
Appropriation Act of 1945, referred to above, and the personnel ceiling legis-
2
lation, also referred to above.
The need for a continuous study of appropriations in order to determine
whether such appropriations were required for the purposes for which they
were provided was Just as real in the case of appropriations for the ordinary
day-to-day operations of the Government as it was in the case of appropriations
for "the national defense, war agencies, and the prosecution of the war".
While the appropriation acts referred to in the preceding paragraph provided
for a continuous study of appropriations made for those particular purposes
with a view towards repealing any parts of such appropriations no longer need-
ed, there was no express statutory provision for a similar study by the Execu-
tive branch of other appropriations, except in the Federal Employees Pay Act
3
of 1945. Section 607 of that act required that personnel ceilings be established
by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and required that the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget establish reserves to the extent he determined that
See supra at p. 5 & 6.
2See Supra at page 6.
'Act of June 30, 1045, 59 Stat. 295-305 (1945); see supra at p. 6.

(13)
savings could be effected as a result of " reduced personnel requirements".
The result of this was Ifeftl when savings did accrue early in a fiscal year from
causes other than reduced personnel requirements, there was no general
statutory authority under which appropriated moneys could be reserved or im-
pounded so that they might be returned to the Treasury. The natural tendency
was to obligate such savings toward the end of the fiscal year even though
there might be no essential need therefor. Briefly, there was no specific
authority such as would be necessary to provide a continuous review of all
appropriations, funds, and contract authorizations in order to insure that such
funds would not be needlessly obligated in cases where circumstances, develop-
ing after the formulation of the estimates or after the enactment of the appro-
priation act, made it clear that such appropriations, funds, or contract author-
izations were in excess of actual requirements.
In 1945, Harold D. Smith, then Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in-
cluded the following comment, pertaining to the authority of the chief executive
to set up reserves out of appropriations, in one of his eight budget principles,
or rules of executive management:
The Principle of Adequate Budget "Tools"
Executive responsibility requires adequate administrative tools . . .
certain powers must be available to the executive in order to assure the
most economical execution of legislative Intent. These include, among
others, authority to make monthly or quarterly allotment of appropria-
tions and to set up reserves out of appropriations. The reserves are to
be used in case of contingencies or are to lapse unexpended if changed
conditions permit execution of the congressional intent with less than the
amount appropriated.
Harold D. Smith, The Management of Your Government (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co. , Inc., 1945), p. 91.

All of the statutory provisions discussed above were fruitful of savings
in expenditures in some degree throughout the Executive branch of the Govern*
ment. The various special acts requiring constant study of the expenditure
status of war appropriations resulted in Congressional rescission of such
appropriations in very large sums. However, all these laws were pointed
toward the same general objective, that is, the efficient and economical use
of appropriated funds. Administrative y they caused a multiplicity of directives
and necessitated complex, cumbersome, and overlapping procedures, particu-
larly under the personnel ceiling requirements. They involved much expense
and confusion and thereby defeated their own purpose, to a certain exteU.
The President, committees of the Congress, and representatives of the
spending agencies have frequently indicated that the personnel ceiling pro-
cedures had outlived their usefulness. In his fiscal year 1948 Budget Message
to the Congress, the President said:
The personnel reductions were facilitated by the statutory limita-
tions on personnel and provisions for detailed personnel ceiling de-
ter rriinatlons enacted by the Seventy-ninth Congress. When we began
to convert to a peacetime basis and appropriations greatly exceeded
expenditures, this legislation served a useful purpose. By the Legis-
lative Reorganisation Act the Congress has in effect decided that the
extent of Federal activities, and hence personnel, should be deter-
mined by the usual appropriations process. The Statutory limita-
tions and personnel ceilings constitute a separate and possibly con-
flicting method of controlling the number of employees. The appro-
priations process, in my mind, is far preferable to the personnel
ceilings and limitations, since these place undue emphasis upon the
number of employees and put a premium on contractual arrange-
ments and other measures to get the necessary work done without
exceeding numerical limitations.
I therefore recommend the repeal of the statutory limitations on
personnel and provisions for personnel celling determinations.

(15)
In its report on the Department of Agriculture Appropriation Bill, fiscal
year 1947 (H. Rept. No. 1659, 79th Congress* p. 3), the House Committee
on Appropriations stated:
The man-year element and the amounts of money appropriated go
hand in hand. If one is increased or decreased the increase or de-
crease of the other automatically follows. From the beginning of
the Government the Congress has invariably provided for the public
service in terms of money appropriated, and the Committee knows
of no reason for deviating from that practice. *
The Director of Budget and Finance of one of the executive departments
testified as follows before a Congressional committee in connection with a
1947 appropriation bill:
This matter of reduction of force, according to my observation, is
more a matter of dollars than any other factor; personnel are based
almost solely on the amount of money allowed .... I have been un-
able to understand the amount of energy that is being required to be
used by the Departments and the Bureau of the Budget, and the amount
of dependence which the Congress apparently has placed on the recent-
ly instituted personnel ceiling procedure, because it is so easy to con-
trol Government personnel, and every other expenditure factor by the
basic decision to grant, withhold, or modify the appropriation. That
is the basic thing which settles, or ought to settle, the question of how
much personnel you are going to need or be allowed to have. To sup-
plement that with an elaborate additional process such as is now in
effect for quarterly personnel ceilings seems superfluous. 2
The above quotations represented a view widely shared both within and
outside of Congress that dollar controls on the basis of programs, services,
organizations, functions, or activities were more economical, more effective-
ly workable, and more responsive to the will of Congress than personnel
ceilings.
1Quoted in joint letter from F. J. Lawton, Acting Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and Frank L. Yates, Acting Comptroller General of the United
States to Hon. Styles Bridges, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U. S. Senate, June 5, 1947.
2Quoted in joint letter from F. J. Lawton, Acting Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and Frank L. Yates, Acting Comptroller General of the United
States to Hon. Styles Bridges, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations,
U. S. Senate, June 5, 1947.

(16)
The Anti-Deficiency Law was substantially amended in September, 1950,
with the passage of the General Appropriation Act, 1951. The next part of




III. THE CURRENT ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT
On 6 September 1950, the General Appropriation Act, 1951 was approved
Section 1211 of this act amended in important respects the then-existing Anti-
Deficiency Law, Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, (31 U. S. C.
665). There have been no further statutory revisions of the Anti-Deficiency
Act to date.
The 1950 amendments were considered necessary by the Congress in
order to have an Anti-Deficiency Act that would serve as a working tool for
effective control of the use of appropriations. It was generally believed, also,
that the related legislation enacted over a period of years should be integrated
with the Anti-Deficiency Act in order to provide a system which would permit
the efficient management of appropriations which the Congress and the people
had a right to expect.
In brief, the 1950 amendments to the Anti-Deficiency Law has had the
following effect upon the then-existing controls discussed in Chapter I of this
paper:
(a) continues the prohibition against spending in excess of the appro-
priation.
(b) extends the regulation of the rate of obligations or expenditures
against appropriations through an apportionment system, down to allotments
or allowances, and fixes responsibility, with penalties for violations.
(c) extends to all appropriations subject to apportionment the procedure






(d) extends to all appropriations subject to apportionment the principle
of reservation from expenditure to provide for contingencies* or to effect
savings made possible by certain factors enumerated in the section.
A more detailed analysis of section 1211 of the General Appropriation
Act, 1951 follows.
The section 1211 consisted of an amendment to the Anti-Deficiency Law
which was a substitute for the entire Law. The current Anti-Deficiency Act,
as amended 6 September 1950 (section 3679, Revised Statutes) is set forth as
section 665 of Title 31, United States Code.
Section 3679 (a) prohibits the making or authorizing of expenditures in
excess of the amount available in any appropriation or fund, and also the
creating or authorizing of an obligation against any appropriation or fund in
excess of the amount available therein. It also prohibits involving the Govern-
ment in any contract or other obligation for the payment of money in advance
of appropriations, unless such contracts and obligations were authorized by
law. While this subsection was designed to prevent deficiencies to the extent
that it prohibits the making of expenditures or the creation of obligations in
excess of appropriations, it is not directed at the rate of spending, and,
therefore, is not connected with the apportionment system usually associated
with the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Section 3679 (b) is essentially a re-enactment of previous prohibitions
against acceptance of voluntary services or employment of personal services
in excess of those authorized by law. It had been held consistently that the




with gratuitous services but contemplated services jfocbecftri on the initiative of
the party rendering them, without request from, or agreement with, the United
States. Hence a person may, with the express consent of the United States,
agree to furnish services gratuitously without violating the statute.
Section 3679 (c), paragraph (1) provides that all appropriations or funds
available for obligation for a definite period of time (barring those which are
excepted by later provisions of the section) be so apportioned as to prevent
obligation or expenditure thereof in a manner which would indicate a necessity
for deficiency or supplemental appropriations for such period. This was de-
signed to insure that appropriations which are available for a fiscal year, or
for other time periods (usually related to fiscal years) will not be obligated or
expended at a rate which would exhaust the appropriation prior to the end of the
period for which the appropriation was made, and thus result in the need for a
deficiency or supplemental appropriation or in drastic curtailment of the ac-
tivity for which the appropriation was made.
Paragraph (1) also provides that all appropriations or funds not limited
to a definite period of time, and all authorizations to create obligations by con-
tract in advance of appropriations (commonly referred to as contract authori-
zations) be so apportioned as to achieve the most effective and economical use
thereof. The first part of this provision relates to the so-called ''no-year '
appropriations, that is, those that are available indefinitely and without rela-
tion to any particular fiscal year i The second part of this provision relates
irhe "no-year" appropriations referred to were previously under the appor-
tionment system, but the authority for their inclusion in that system stemmed
from Executive Order 8512, dated 13 August 1940, rather than from the
previous Anti-Deficiency Law, which related only to fiscal year appropria-
tions .




to contract authorizations which may or may not be required by law to be
executed with reference to any particular fiscal year. This provision is not
aimed directly at preventing deficiencies, but it was believed that "no-year"
appropriations and contract authorizations must be included in the apportion-
ment system and be controlled to the extent necessary to insure efficiency
and economy in carrying out the purpose for which such appropriations and
authorizations are granted by the Congress.
The last sentence of paragraph (1) provides that, as used thereafter in
the section, "the term 'appropriation' means appropriations, funds, and
authorizations to create obligations by contract in advance of appropriations.
Section 3679 (c), paragraph (2) authorizes the officer making apportion-
ments and reapportionments to establish reserves "to provide for contingen-
cies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or through
changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other develop-
ments 1" subsequent to the date on which the appropriation, fund, or contract
authorization was made available. For the reasons stated in Chapter II of
this paper, this authority was believed to be essential to sound financial
management. It is recognized that this provision presented a policy question
for decision by the Congress. It is generally considered, also, that this
authority must be exercised with considerable care in order to avoid usurping
the powers of Congress. However, appropriations are not regarded generally
as mandates to spend money to the limit of such appropriations without regard
to any considerations of efficiency or economy.
1See supra at p. 12 & 13.
:
(21)
The granting of this authority, accompanied by the restrictions and safe-
guards contained in the section, was in line with the action previously taken by
the Congress in enacting the provision in the personnel ceiling law (the Federal
Employees Pay Act of 1945) for the establishing of reserves where savings in
salaries, wages, or other categories of expense were made possible by reason
of "reduced personnel requirements". Further, the authority to establish
reserves to provide for contingencies is essential if there is to be avoided the
deficiency apportionments which previously were made under the authority
contained in the previous Anti-Deficiency Law to waive or modify initial ap-
2
portionments in emergencies or unusual circumstances. Sound management
clearly requires that such reserves be maintained, and the apportioning offi-
cer should be, and is, empowered to enforce the requirement.
Paragraph (2) also provides that the Congress will be requested to
rescind any amount reserved in the apportionment process when it is found
that such amount will not be required to carry out the purposes of the appro-
priation, fund, or contract authorization concerned. The machinery by which
such rescissions are effected is the same as that provided in the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921, as amended, for estimates of appropriations; that is,
recommendations for rescissions of appropriations in all branches of the
Government are made to the President, but the recommendations for the
Legislative branch and the Judiciary are transmitted by him to the Congress
without revision. This provision extends to all appropriations the direction
ee supra at p. 6.
ee supra at p. 2.
:
(22)
previously given by the Congress for the review of appropriations for defense
purposes and the recommending of the repeal of any part of such appropria-
tions no longer required. At the time of receiving and acting upon such
recommendations, the Congress has an opportunity to exercise its judgment
as to continuance of the need for the appropriation.
Section 3679 (c), paragraph (3), provides for apportionments "by
months, calendar quarters, operating seasons, or other time periods, or by
activities, functions, projects, or objects, or by a combination thereof. " It
will be recalled that the previous Anti-Deficiency Law provided for apportion -
2
ments "by monthly or other allotments". As discussed previously, this pro-
vision generally had been interpreted as requiring apportionments by time
periods, and it had become the almost universal practice to make apportion-
ments by calendar quarters. As noted previously, the operations of many
agencies do not fit into a system of calendar quarters but are best gauged by
operating seasons or other time periods. Further, as indicated previously
with respect to the Maritime Commission revolving fund, apportionments by
time periods without regard to the objects of expenditure covered by the
3
apportionments did not provide an adequate control. Paragraph (3) further
provides that, except as otherwise specified by the officer making the appor-
tionment, amounts apportioned shall remain available for obligation on a
cumulative basis in accordance with the terms of the appropriation, unless
reapportioned.
lSte supra at p. 5 It 6.
2See supra at p. 10.
See supra at p. 10 and 11.
.-
(23)
Section 3679 (c), paragraph (4) provides that apportionments be reviewed
at least four times each year, and contemplates that upon such review, such
reapportionments will be made or such reserves established, modified, or
released as may be necessary to further the effective use of the appropria-
tion, fund, or contract authorization concerned. This provision, coupled with
the provision referred to above for establishing reserves, makes possible a
continuous and active study, currently, of the progress and effectiveness of
the execution of the programs authorized by the Congress.
Section 3679 (d) designates the officers who make apportionments and
reapportionments. This subsection is divided into two paragraphs, the first
of which relates to appropriations, funds, and contract authorizations avail-
able to the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary, or the District of Columbia. In
this connection it is Interesting to note that the previous Anti-Deficiency Law
covered "all appropriations made for contingent expenses or other general
purposes" (except certain types which were specifically exempted) without
distinguishing between appropriations for the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary,
or the Executive Branch, except that contingent appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives were specifically exempt from the apportion-
ment provisions. Thus it happened that the appropriations available to the
Legislative Branch and those available to the Judiciary, except the exempted
contingent appropriations mentioned, were inadvertently made subject to
apportionment by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in Executive Order
26166 of 10 June 1933. This condition has been corrected; the first paragraph
ASee supra at p. 2.
See supra at page 3&4.
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of section 3679 (d) made separate provision for apportioning appropriations
available to the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary, or the District of Columbia,
and designated the officer having administrative control of such appropriation
to make the apportionment thereof. A time limit was provided within which
the apportionment must be made in writing.
The second paragraph provides that appropriations for the agencies,
required to be apportioned, shall be apportioned or reapportioned in writing
by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and that the agencies shall submit
information necessary therefor in such form and manner and at such time or
times as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may prescribe. Definite
time limits for submitting such Information and for making apportionments
are provided, the net result of which is to require that apportionments in all
cases be made not later than twenty days before the beginning of the fiscal
year for which the appropriation is available or not more than thirty days
after the approval of the act by which such appropriation is made available,
whichever is later. These provisions were aimed at preventing delays which
had occurred in some cases in the past in the submission of proposed appor-
tionments by the agencies, and in the making of apportionments by the Bureau
of the Budget. These provisions also cured a defect in the previous Anti-
Deficiency Law which, as discussed above, did not recognize that appropria-
tions may not be made prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.
The second paragraph also defines the term "agency' as meaning "any
executive department, agency, commission, authority, administration, board,
or other independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government,
I See supra at p. 8 4 9.
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including any corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is
an instrumentality of the United States".
The purpose of section 3679 (e) is to provide a workable standard for
the making of apportionments or reapportionments which would indicate a
necessity for a deficiency or supplemental estimate. This subsection pro-
vides that:
(e) (1) No apportionment or reapportionment which, in the judgment
of the officer making such apportionment or reapportionment, would
indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental estimate shall be
made except upon a determination by such officer that such action is
required because of (A) any laws enacted subsequent to the transmission
to the Congress of the estimates for an appropriation which require ex-
penditures beyond administrative control; or (B) emergencies involving
the safety of human life, the protection of property, or the immediate
welfare of individuals in cases where on appropriation has been made
to enable the United States to make payment of, or contributions toward,
, sums which are required to be paid to individuals either in specific
amounts fixed by law or in accordance with formulae prescribed by law.
(2) In each case of an apportionment or a reapportionment which,
in the judgment of the officer making such apportionment or reappor-
tionment, would indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental
estimate, such officer shall immediately submit a detailed report of
the facts of the case to the Congress. In transmitting any deficiency
or supplemental estimates required on account any such apportionment
or reapportionment, reference shall be made to such report. 1
Many new laws enacted subsequent to the submission to the Congress of
estimates of appropriations have resulted in increasing the rate of obligations
in that fiscal year. In some cases these laws were approved after the passage
of the appropriation act, and in other cases shortly before the appropriation
was made. Technically, in the latter type of case there may have been, in
some instances, an opportunity to seek additional appropriations to carry out
the functions imposed by the new laws, but as a practical matter the legislative
XAct of September 6, 1950, 31 U. S. C. sec. 665 (1950).
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process seldom permits the passage of newly-conceived appropriation legis-
lation in the last few days, or even weeks of a legislative session. It was for
this reason that provision was made in clause (A) above for apportionments or
reapportionments on a basis indicating a necessity for a deficiency or supple-
mental estimate in cases where new laws resulting in increased costs are
enacted "subsequent to the transmission to the Congress of the estimates" for
an appropriation, rather than subsequent to the enactment of the appropriation
act. This procedure is in line with that now established under section 203 of
the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 ae amended by the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950, which provides that the President may from time to
me transmit to Congress proposed supplemental deficiency appropriations as
are necessary on account of iaws enacted after the transmission of the
Budget ..."
Familiar examples of laws which necessitate substantial increases in the
obligational rate of certain appropriations are those increasing compensation
Cd
pension payments to veterans; those making certain additional insurance
nefits available to veterans; and those increasing the pay and allowances of
military personnel.
Clause (B) above was intended to permit apportionments on a basis indi-
cating a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental estimate when the rate of
obligating an appropriation must be increased to provide for emergencies in-
olving the safety of human life, the protection of property, or the immediate
welfare of certain classes of individuals. A good example of the last type of







to be desirable that programs of this type be carried on without delay or cur-
tailment, even in the event changed conditions indicated that appropriations
therefor were inadequate. The need for flexibility in the use of these appro-
priations is recognised in both the Legislative and Executive branches.
Clause (B) above was also intended to improve certain weaknesses in
the previous Anti-Deficiency Law. As indicated previously, it was not clear
what was meant in that part of the previous Anti-Deficiency Law which
authorized waiver or modification of an apportionment "upon the happening
of some extraordinary emergency or unusual circumstance which could not
be anticipated at the time of making such apportionment. " The previous
Anti-Deficiency Law was equally vague in excepting from the apportionment
system those appropriations made "for objects required or authorized by law
2
without reference to the amounts annually appropriated therefor"
.
The provision of paragraph (2), quoted above, for an immediate report
to the Congress whenever an appropriation is apportioned or reapportioned
on a basis which indicates a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appro-
priation gives the Committee on Appropriations an opportunity to question
immediately any apportionment or reapportionment which they believe to be
not in accord with the will of the Congress.
Section 3679 (f) provides for the exemption from the apportionment
system of certain appropriations and funds. These exemptions include trust
funds and working funds, expenditures from which have no significant effect
on the financial operations of the Government; any appropriation made
See supra at p. 8.
o
See supra at p. 8.
'
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specifically for payment of claims, judgments, refunds, and draw -backs;
interest on, or retirement of, the public debt; also exempted are appropria-
tions to the Senate or House of Representatives or to any Member, committee
,
office (including the office of the Architect of the Capitol), officer, or em-
ployee thereof, and certain other enumerated exemptions.
The need for carrying the apportionments down through the appropria-
tions into allotments and allowances has been discussed in Chapter II of this
paper, where the lack of such procedures was considered a major defect in
the previous ArU-Deficiency Law. Section 3679 (g) provides for regulations
for a system of administrative control " which shall be designed to (A) restric
obligations or expenditures against each appropriation to the amount of appor-
tionments or reapportionments made for each such appropriation, and (£)
enable such officer or agency head to fix responsibility for the creation of any
obligation or the making of any expenditure in excess of an apportionment or
reapportionment. " These regulations are subject to the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget in order to insure a certain amount of
uniformity therein; however, an effort has been made by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget not to deprive any agency of the opportunity to develop
such a system of allotments and allowances as might be required to fit its
particular needs.
The regulations referred to above have been issued as Budget-Treasury
Regulation No. 1. A detailed discussion of these Regulations is beyond the
scope of this paper; however, the first paragraph of the Introduction is quoted
See supra at p. 9 6. 10.
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below, with the observation that all of the statutory references therein have
been mentioned, in more or less detail, in preceding portions of this paper:
This Regulation is issued pursuant to section 3679 of the Revised
Statutes as amended (31 U. S. C. 665); the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921, as amended (particularly section 213, 31 U. S. C. 21)
and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (particularly
section 114, 31 U. S. C. 666 (a)(b)). The Regulation relates to
apportionments and reports on the status of appropriations and
other authorizations, and is designed to serve the purposes of
information and control in the execution of the Government's
budgetary and financial programs. *
Section 3679 (h) prohibits any officer or employee of the United States
from authorizing or creating any obligation or from making any expenditure in
excess of an apportionment or reapportionment, or "in excess of the amount
permitted by regulations prescribed pursuant to sub-section (g) of this sec-
2
tion. " This provision was designed to insure that the officers and employees
who actually distribute the appropriation into allotments and sub-allotments
will be responsible for keeping them within the apportionments, and that the
officers and employees who actually create obligations or make expenditures
against appropriations will be responsible for observing the allotments and sub-
allotments provided.
Section 3679 (i) provides specific penalties for violation of the Act, as
well as other procedures which it was believed would have a salutary effect in
discouraging the creation of deficiencies or of situations leading to requests
for deficiency appropriations. This sub-section is divided into two paragraphs,
the first of which provides penalties for any officer or employee of the United
1Bureau of the Budget and Treasury Department, Budget-Treasury Regulation
No. 1 as revised through September 1953 (Washington: uovernmem criming
Office), sec. 1.
2See supra at p. 28
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States who violates subsections (a), (b), or (h) of the Act. Such penalties
comprise "appropriate administrative discipline* including when circum-
stances warrant, suspension from duty without pay or removal from office;
and any officer or employee of the United States who shall knowingly and will-
fully violate subsection (a), (b), or (h) of this section shall, upon conviction,
be fined not more than $5, 000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both. " This paragraph was an attempt to improve upon the previous Anti-
Deficiency Law, which in Chapter II of this paper was commented upon to the
effect that the penalty provisions, while possibly not severe enough to con-
stitute adequate punishment for serious and willful violations of the law, were
entirely too severe when considered in connection with minor or inadvertent
2
violations. The improvements consisted in specifying the actions which are
subject to penalty, and by providing for more practicable penalties, which
can be gauged with reference to the seriousness of the offense.
The second paragraph requires an immediate report of all pertinent
facts together with a statement of the action taken thereon in each case of a
violation of subsection (a), (b), or (h) of this section. These reports are
made to the President, through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and
Briefly, subsections (a), (b), and (h) prohibit the making or authorizing of
expenditures and the creating or authorizing of obligations in excess of the
amount available in any appropriation; prohibit acceptance of voluntary ser-
vices or employment of personal services in excess of those authorized by
law; prohibit the authorizing or creating of any obligation or the making of
any expenditure in excess ox an apportionment or reapportionment or in excess
of the amount permitted by regulations.
2See supra at p. 9. The penalty provisions of the previous Anti-Deficiency Law
provided for punishing violators by summary removal from office, and a fine




to the Congress. In this connection, detailed information to be reported on
violations is prescribed in section 15, Part I of Budget-Treasury Regulation
1
No. 1 .
It should be noted that, in addition to the penalty provisions of section
3679 (i), discussed above, the General Accounting Office, under its authority
and responsibilities pursuant to the provisions of the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921, as amended, and of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
has access to the original accounting records of the agencies, including allot-
ment and sub-allotment accounts, and it is incumbent upon the General Account
ing Office under the latter act to make reports of expenditure analyses to the
Committees on Appropriations, the Committees on Expenditures, and the
legislative committees of the two Houses of Congress, in order that the
Congress may be able to determine whether public funds have been economi-
cally and efficiently administered and expended.
See supra, p. 29.

IV CONCLUSIONS
In February, 1948, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government Included the following comment, in its report on
Budgeting:
Checks and Deficits
The Congress has long been interested in seeing that agencies so
spend their appropriations as not to incur deficits. Various actions
have been taken both by the Congress and Presidents to achieve this
end. These have finally resulted in a system of apportioning appro-
priations.
This system requires the spending agencies to submit to the
Budget Bureau for its approval their requests for quarterly appor-
tionments of their appropriations. Any revisions in the original
apportionments require supplementary forms to be submitted to
the Bureau for approval. A copy of the apportionments and any
revisions goes to the Treasury for its information.
Each month the spending agencies are required to report on the
status of their appropriations, including obligations and balances.
But these reports on the status of appropriations are often mislead-
ing, since the spending agencies may report their obligations as
they see fit. Neither the Budget Bureau nor the Treasury seems
to have any direct check or control over what these agencies report.
Furthermore, the administrative accounts, as prescribed by the
Comptroller General, do not provide properly for the keeping of
obligations under apportionments. Under these circumstances the
authority of the Budget Bureau to approve all apportionments on
behalf of the President means very little in actually preventing
current deficits.
This is the most glaring weakness of the present system of
pportlonments.
Much needed control cannot be effectively applied under the
system of accounting presently employed by the operating depart-
ments and agencies. This is an important reason for our subse-
quent accounting recommendations.
Reductions in Appropriated Expenditures
Present law and practice are not clear on whether or not the




appropriated amounts during the year for which they were provided.
The Commission's recommendation was as follows:
We recommend that it is in the public interest that this question
be clarified and, in any event, that the President should have auth-
ority to reduce expenditures under appropriations, if the purposes
intended by the Congress are still carried out.
In September, 1953, the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report
stated that, as of 1950, this recommendation had been "mostly" accomplished,
but that "a review of the effectiveness of action taken on this recommendation
appears warranted. M
As part of the apportionment process, part of any agency's funds are
usually impounded by the Bureau of the Budget and held in reserve, the idea
being that the agency may be able to carry on its full program without having
to use all its funds. In certain instances the Bureau of the Budget has im-
pounded funds, not for the sake of holding a sum in reserve against unforeseen
emergencies, but for the purpose of preventing an agency from proceeding
with its program to the full extent contemplated by the funds made available
by Congress. Agencies, with their funds thus impounded, have been unable
to draw funds from the Treasury and have, therefore, questioned the legal
authority of the Bureau of the Budget to curtail their programs.
i
Report on Budgeting and Accounting in the Executive Branch. A Report to the
Congress prepared by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch




Status of the Hoover Report 1949-1953, Vol. II. A Report Prepared for ref-
erence use by the Members of the Citizens' Committee, the press and students
of Government. Washington: Research Department, Citizens' Committee for
the Hoover Report, September, 1953, p. 18; 38.

(34)
The legal basis for the establishment of reserves when the objective is
to avoid a deficiency in an appropriation is clearly found in the current Anti-
Deficiency Act. The Act also authorizes the establishment of reserves "to
provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made
possible by or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of opera-
tions, or other developments. " Where the reserve is established with the
purpose of curtailing a particular program, certain Congressmen and others
have labeled such action an illegal transgression on congressional preroga-
tives. They contend that when the Bureau of the Budget decides on its own
motion that appropriations should not be spent for the purposes prescribed by
Congress it is in effect usurping the power of Congress to control the purse.
Those who defend the power of the Bureau of the Budget to take such
action contend that appropriations must be considered not as mandates to spend,
but as outside limits within which the Executive Branch must operate. They
note that the courts have repeatedly held that the provision in the Constitution
which provides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in con-
2
sequence of appropriations made by law" is a mere limitation on the spending
power of the Executive Branch and a simple restriction on those who disburse
public funds, and is not a grant of special power to Congress making it manda-
tory to spend all funds voted by Congress. It is further argued that the Presi-
dent has the constitutional duty imposed upon him to "take care that the laws be
See supra at p. 20
2
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9. Clause 7.
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faithfully executed", including appropriation acts among others, and that his
determination that times have so changed since the enactment of the appro-
priation that it is no longer wise to spend the entire amount or to carry out
the program then contemplated, cannot be successfully disputed.
The specific legislative authority to establish reserves, contained in the
2
current Anti-Deficiency Act, and discussed heretofore, provides ample legal
basis for the impounding of funds by the Bureau of the Budget where the im-
pounding of such funds in no way curtails the performance of the program
approved by Congress as the basis for the grant of funds. Where reserves
involve the curtailment of programs specifically considered and approved by
Congress, there is scant legal authority for such action by the Bureau of the
Budget.
It appears that the recommendation, made by the Commission on
3
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, and quoted above,
that it is in the public interest that the question of the right of the Bureau of
the Budget and the President to reduce appropriated amounts during the year
for which they were provided, be clarified, has been fully accomplished in
so far as such reduction of expenditures does not curtail the purposes intended
by the Congress.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a brief discussion of some
of the difficulties experienced within the Navy in connection with the apportionment
1United States Constitution, Article II, Section 3.
o
See supra at p. 20 & 34
3«See supra at p. 33
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process, and includes charts and forms, a detailed study of which will serve
to indicate how the apportionment process does in fact exercise a complete
control of Navy funds.
The chart, page 42, presents the flow of authorizations required to make
funds available to the Chiefs of the Bureaus of the Navy Department. The ap-
propriations which the Congress establishes for naval functions are granted to
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in the sense that utilization of such
appropriations is limited to the amounts authorized by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget. Usually, the Division Chief of the Bureau of the Budget,
under a delegation of authority, determines the amounts of the appropriations
which may be utilized for the naval functions.
By directive, the Secretary of Defense has provided that apportionment
requests shall be submitted by and approved apportionments be accounted for
by the Secretaries of the military departments. The Secretary of Defense
retains full control, however, in that apportionment requests are reviewed in
great detail by his staff which makes recommendations to the Bureau of the
Budget on the amounts to be apportioned.
The Secretary of the Navy has delegated to the Comptroller of the Navy
the authority and functions of administration of apportionments. Based on
requests, the Comptroller allocates funds under each appropriation account
to the Chief of the responsible bureau. Under provisions of the current Anti-
Deficiency Act, the Bureau Chief has no authority prior to the receipt of such
allocation to authorize or create any obligation against the congressional
appropriation for the functions assigned to his Bureau.
'See supra at p. 29
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Thus it can be seen that a delay in apportionments, for any reason,
tends to increase the difficulties of achieving effective, economical, and ef-
ficient execution of authorized programs and operations.
This difficulty was indicated by the Assistant Comptroller of the Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports, in an address on 27 November 1951:
The Department of Defense Appropriation Act was not approved
until 18 October 1951, or 3-1/2 months after the start of the fiscal
year. The Navy Comptroller's Office submitted its request for ap-
portionment of fiscal year 1952 funds to OSD and the Bureau of the
Budget in the first week of November. We are presently obligating
funds for the current year on the basis of requested apportionments,
which have not yet been approved.
The uncertainty thus engendered raises critical problems for the
financing of Navy programs, e.g., in preparing the apportionment
request we did not know whether we would have to absorb the civilian
pay increases. There were other areas in which funds were sched-
uled for obligation at an accelerated rate on the assumption that
forces would be augmented at a faster rate than that provided for in
the fiscal year 1952 budget. The fact that almost half the year has
gone by and we still do not have a firm apportionment schedule fur-
ther complicates Navy programming. If we obligated at too fast a
rate in the first half of the year, it will mean that some drastic
changes in program plans may be required for the 2nd half of the
year.
*
The chart, page 43, presents the flow of authorizations from the bureau
management control level to the operating level, or in some cases to the
management control level of other organizational units for subsequent author-
ization to the operating level. On the chart, delegations of authority and sub-
^lexton, E. W., Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. "Comptrollers in the Navy.
"
Address delivered before the Shipyard Commanders Conference, Bureau of
Ships, Navy Department. Washington, D.C.. 27 November 1951
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allocations are distinguished from the authorizations shown in the lower por-
tion of the chart in that they normally relate to entire accounts or groups of
accounts.
The apportionment system is policed by the Bureau of the Budget through
a system of monthly financial reports. One of the principal reports is Stand-
ard Form 133-Rev.
,
page 47, Report on Status of Appropriation Accounts.
This report is prepared from records maintained in the bureaus and offices
under the Bureau Allotment Accounting System and reflects data for the appro-
priation as a whole. In addition to this report, DD form 690N, page 48,
Analysis of Appropriation Status by Activity and/ or Project includes data on
obligations incurred by budget activities or major divisions first below the
appropriation level. These two reports are among the means of exercising
broad fiscal control throughout the Navy. Other important reports include
Standard Form 131-Rev.
,
page 45, Apportionment Schedule (by time periods),
and Standard Form 132-Rev.
,
page 49, Reapportionment Schedule (by time
periods).
At the present time, at the Navy bureau level, there is some concern
with the complicated process of obtaining apportionments of appropriated funds.
The frequently long delay between requests for apportionments and their final
approval by the Bureau of the Budget and subsequent receipt by the bureau
creates difficulties. In addition to such procedural difficulties, considerable
^ee supra at p. 3 7
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concern has been expressed over the trend, in the recent past, toward more
and more detailed reviews of apportionment requests by comparatively low
level officials in the higher echelons of the Department of Defense and the
Bureau of the Budget. Apportionment requests are approaching, in effect, a
resubmission and rehearing of the budget estimates, but without an opportunity
for top level Bureau and Navy officials to attend such hearings to assist in
defending the Bureau's financial plans.
Bureaus' requests for apportionment must be supported by voluminous
details. This involves countless hours of preparation, and interferes with
other essential work.
Isiavy bureau personnel anticipate more strenuous efforts by higher
authority to effect savings by establishing reserves for "savings and contin-
gencies". In other words, they are greatly concerned that the provisions of
the current Anti-Deficiency Act may be used for the purposes of "item veto".
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For Fiscal Year 19_5iL
Sheet of Sheets
Department of the Navy
Appropriation Title and Symbol
Ships and Facilities, Navy, 1955
1751601
Amounts Available for Apportionment




C. Appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations (—
3. Other new authorizations
4. Anticipated appropriation reimbursements - _.
5. Anticipated net transfers to ( + ) and from (— ) this account
6. Total Amount Available for Apportionment..
Apportionments and Reserves
7. Apportionments:
A. First quarter. _






B. For obligations to be incurred in subsequent years.
C. For other contingencies
10. Total Reserves..















T^ic/La^. Z^/ac^Submitted /V*CAaoC Q£*< 10 Jim 51t
(Authorized officer) (Date)
RICHARD BLACK „...«,„...,.,„,.„
Bureau of the Budget Comments :
Apportioned
HARRI GRAY
Footnotes to be shown on reverse side of form :
a/ Sources of reimbursements (see subpar. 065101-8)










The Bureau of the Budget
will use lines 1-6 only
when changes are made in
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" LINE 8, S.F. 131
OR S.F. 132
LINE 10, S.F. 131










For the Period Ended .31. October jg^
Sheet of Sheets
Department of the Navy
Bureau of Ships
Ships and Facilities, Navy
LINES 10A + IOC +-11 OF S.F. 133'|
FOR 30 JUNE OF PRIOR YEAR
(Ralaburiaatnta rtotlnbla, 1 July)
Amounts Available
1. Unobligated balances brought forward July 1__.
2. Appropriations:
A. Realized - ^50,000,000.00
B. Anticipated for rest of year
C. Appropriations to liquidate contract authoriza-
tions (— ) -
3. Other new authorizations
4. Appropriation reimbursements:
A. Collected.— -
B. Increase (+ ) or decrease (— ) since July 1 in
reimbursements receivable
C. Anticipated for rest of year
. Net transfers to ( + ) or from (— ) this account:
A. Actual
B. Anticipated for rest of year















(EUlBburaaMnta raojlvabla, and of period)
Status of Amount Available
7. Accrued expenditures— —
8. Undelivered orders outstanding:
A. At end of period (+ )
B. Undelivered orders transferred (+ or — ).
C. Asof Julyl (-) _..
9. Obligations incurred — — -
10. Unobligated balances of apportionments and reserves;
A. Balance of apportionments to end of quarter.--
B. Apportionments for subsequent quarters.—
C. Reserves
11. Other unobligated balances
12. Total Amount Available
(Outstanding commitments In 10a entry)
Relationship of Obligations to Payments
18. Unpaid obligations:
A. As of July 1
B. Obligations transferred to (+ ) or from (—
)
this account.
C. At end of period









LINE 13C OF S.F. 133 FOR















Footnotes to be 3hown on reverse side of form :
a/ Schedule of actual transfers (subpar. 065203 - 12)
b/ Schedule of anticipated transfers (subpar. 065203 - 13)
c/ Advances to allocated working funds (subpar. 065203 - 18)
d/ Significant obligation adjustments (subpar. 065203 - 18)

(48)





fc 3 2 8
O < Z (-
3 q
3 st
CO 03 H ~* lA
<\i <*\ C- is P-
f» C\J O (7^ o
tf\ 00 <n rH oH q TV 00
3
p~




« . P- PL, H CO

















PREPARATION OF STANDARD FORM 132 (BY TIME PERIODS)
AS RELATED TO STANDARD FORMS 131 AND 133.
Entries in this column will be copied from most
recently submitted SF 131 or SF 132, using Bureau
of the Budget approved data when such SF 131 or
SF 132 has already been approved, or using data
submitted by Navy when such SF 131 or 5F 132 has





Department of the Navy




r Fiscal Year 19.5k.
Agency No.
.
appropriation Title and Symbol
Ships and Facilities, Navy, 1955
1751601
Amounts Available for Apportionment




Entries on lines 4.A and 4.B will be identical with
entries on lines 4A and 4.B of most recent S.F. 133.
Entry on line 4.C will be identical with entry on
line AC of most recent S.F. 133 or footnote ex-
plaining difference will be shown.
-) since July 1 in
A. Collected
B. Increase (+ ) or decrease (-
reimbursements receivable
C. Anticipated for rest of year
Net transfers to (+ ) or from (— ) this account:
A. Actual
B. Anticipated for rest of year







A. First quarter 212,023,°17






A. For savings _
B. For obligations to be incurred in subsequent years.
C. For other contingencies.
10. Total Reserves..






























The Bureau of the Budget
ill use these lines only
when changes are made in
igures submitted by the
gency.
1
Entry on line 5A will be
identical with entry on
line 5A of most recent S.F.
133. Entry on line 5B will
be identical with entry on
line 5B of most recent S.F.
133 or footnote explaining










Submitted^^^£^I^^A=. 28 Nov 1?
(Authorised officer) (Date)
RICHARD BLACK .. .. .,„..,h, „,,
Assistant Comptroller of the Navy
Apportioned
HARRY GRAY
.-^.. 10 Dec 195k
(Date)
Footnotes to be shown on reverse side of form :
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